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EVERSON V. BROWN: HERMENEUTICS, FRAMERS'
INTENT, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JOHN T. VALAURI*
This essay examines the establishment clause framers'
intent debate. But I do not take sides in this longtime dispute.
Instead I question some important unstated assumptions made
by participants of both stripes in order to undermine them.
One assumption is that there are, at least in principle, specific,
historically discoverable matters of fact about the 1789 intent
of the framers of the first amendment and the 1868 framers of
the fourteenth amendment.' A second assumption is that these
facts clearly and directly determine outcomes in controversial
contemporary establishment clause cases. 2 Both assumptions
achieve doctrinal certainty at the cost of historical incomplete-
ness and interpretive oversimplification. They employ a histor-
ical history, static meaning, and mechanical interpretation.
They do have one main allure: they provide easy answers for
hard cases.
But this is a false allure. In opposition to this received
approach, I want to focus on issues of historical difference and
development which might accord some overlooked, complex
problems more extended, serious attention. There are two
complaints I have against the standard views. The lesser com-
plaint is that the historical record on framers' intent is less clear
than either side lets on. Both achieve clarity through selectivity
in sources and readings.
My second and major complaint is that there is a missing
step in the argument. Even if all the historical assertions made
by separationists or nonpreferentialists about the minds of the
framers are accepted, that still will not determine case results
today. Too much has changed in the interim conceptually,
institutionally, and historically.
Now you may feel you can safely ignore the views of an
obscure midwestern law professor and perhaps even the
approach suggested by an obscure continental philosophy.
The apparent risk is small. For this reason and others, I will
* Professor of Law, Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University.
1. See infra notes 31 and 32 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text.
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strive to cast my argument in terms of considerations not so
easily dismissed. My hermeneutic arguments have cognates in
American legal and constitutional history and doctrine. The
hermeneutic approach has deep affinities with the American
legal and philosophical pragmatic tradition personified by Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.' More important yet, the
approach to historical issues and constitutional interpretation I
argue for here is employed in the paradigmatic case for mod-
ern constitutional jurisprudence, Brown v. Board of Education.4
I want, then, to get the religion clauses disputants to pay
more than lip service to Holmes and Brown. I want to inject
into this debate some of the richness found in the overall con-
stitutional framers' intent dispute, richness largely absent
here.' The religion clauses debate is innocent of the philo-
sophical interpretive issues of the other debate.6 Both sides
are mainly content with their common historical approach
because each gets, they believe, sufficient historical ammuni-
tion to fight their fight. Interpretive advances occurred in
Brown because proponents of desegregation had weak histori-
cal arguments concerning the specific intent of the framers.7
Perhaps Brown made a virtue of necessity, but as Holmes
reminds us, the role played by historical continuity in constitu-
tional interpretation is only a necessary, not an obligatory one.8
The conceptual, institutional, and historical changes since
the 1780s and 1860s have recast the constitutional terrain. The
older facts of the matter concerning intent, if they are facts, do
not directly answer modern questions. The Virginia General
Assessment Bill of 1784 would doubtless be unconstitutional
today upon most theories of the religion clauses.9 Only some-
one who denied incorporation might assert the contrary. In
3. On the relevance of pragmatism to the hermeneutic tradition see K.
APEL, C. S. PEIRCE: FROM PRAGMATISM TO PRAGMATICISM (J. Krois trans.
1981). On the relation of Holmes to American pragmatism see Hantzis, Legal
Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 541 (1988).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. I have elsewhere tried to give a taxonomy of this larger debate. See
Valauri, The Varieties of Constitutional Theory: A Comment on Perry and Hoy, 15 N.
Ky. L. REV. 499 (1988).
6. For a notable exception see Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 1118 (1988).
7. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 617-56 (1976). See also R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-33 (1977).
8. "[H]istorical continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a
necessity." 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 191 (1920).
9. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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any event, it is not our current problem. On the other hand,
Justice Black's quandary in Everson v. Board of Education 10 of
wanting to maintain the wall of separation between church and
state while not denying religious citizens otherwise generally
available governmental benefits is a modern problem unfore-
seen by even the most clairvoyant of the framers.
In what follows, I sketch what some of these new problems
are and how they impact contemporary establishment clause
doctrine. First, I briefly present some hermeneutic tools to
employ in bridging historical gaps. Then, after making some
Holmes/Brown analogies, I apply them to the problem of effec-
tuating establishment clause meaning in the modern context of
the nonpreferentialism debate and suggest a rewriting of
Everson.
I. EVERSON AND THE RECEIVED VIEW
The best source for the received view of the role of fram-
ers' intent in shaping the meaning of the establishment clause
for nonpreferentialism today is Justice Black's opinion in Ever-
son." Not only does it inaugurate the modern era of establish-
ment clause jurisprudence by applying that clause to the states
through incorporation in the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, 2 but it also sets the list of sources and
parameters for the framers' intent debate over establishment
clause meaning. Both the Everson dissenters and most separa-
tionists and nonpreferentialists today proceed from Black's his-
torical matrix in Everson. 3 They differ mainly in their
evaluations of what the historical materials mean.
Recall, then, Justice Black's historical narrative. It is the
model for all that follows. After an initial statement of how dif-
ferent the 1947 religious/constitutional situation is from that
of the framers' era, Black nevertheless immediately plunges
into a discussion of that self-same history. 4 From this discus-
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11. Id. at 3-18.
12. Id. at8.
13. See id. at 33-58 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also L. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986) (a
separationist view); see also R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982) (a nonpreferentialist view).
14. Black first says, "[T]he expression 'law respecting an establishment
of religion,' probably does not so vividly remind present-day Americans of
the evils, fears, and political problems that caused that expression to be
written into our Bill of Rights." Two sentences later he continues, "[Ilt is not
inappropriate briefly to review the background and environment of the
1990]
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sion, he reaches the general, apparently timeless conclusion
that "individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a
government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support,
or otherwise to assist any and all religions, or to interfere with
the beliefs of any religious individual or group."' 5
He next finds the climax of preconstitutional establish-
ment clause history in the Virginia debate over its General
Assessment Bill of 1784.16 He highlights the role of James
Madison in the fight against this Bill, focusing on Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance. He also emphasizes the role of
Thomas Jefferson as the author of the Virginia Bill for Reli-
gious Liberty, which prevailed over the General Assessment
Bill. He canonizes the role of both framers here saying,
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions
of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of
which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles,
had the same objective and were intended to provide the
same protection against governmental intrusion on reli-
gious liberty as the Virginia statute.17
Black then traces the historical path to dominance in estab-
lishment clause meaning of the Jefferson/Madison view of
establishment. 8 He presents the import of the clause as broad,
general, and timeless. He next fleshes this principle out in his
famous list of prohibited establishments of religion. 9
period in which that constitutional language was fashioned and adopted."
Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id. at 11-14.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 13-15.
19. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted).
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Having set out the majestic sweep of history and principle
concerning the establishment clause, Justice Black notoriously
derails it with the nonhistorical assertion that the state cannot
bar "members of any . . .faith, because of their faith, or lack of it,
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation. '"20
Finally, he uses this general benefit theory to uphold the chal-
lenged school busing statute against establishment clause
attack.2
The Everson dissenters fully accept Justice Black's estab-
lishment clause history; they deride only his general benefit
theory and the specific result he reaches through it. Justice
Jackson in dissent, for example, complains that "the under-
tones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromis-
ing separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant
with its conclusion yielding support of their commingling in
educational matters."
22
Justice Rutledge's dissent gives the longest historical dis-
cussion. It fully follows in form and content the outline I have
presented of Justice Black's discussion. Once again, Rutledge
speaks of the broad purpose of the amendment "to create a
complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every
form of public aid or support for religion."'23 Similarly, he
emphasizes the importance of the framing history. He gives
supreme importance to the roles played by Madison and Jeffer-
son in the Virginia religion debates of the 1780s. He uses the
Virginia history to fill in the sparser, more ambiguous debates
in the first Congress. 4 Everson's history has remained the
Court's (and most academics') received view of framer's intent
since 1947.
II. THE JAFFREE DISSENT
The main challenge to the prevailing establishment clause
orthodoxy is found in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v.
Jaffree. 2 5 But even here the exception proves the rule, for
Rehnquist chooses to fight his historical battle largely on his
20. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 17-18.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Id. at 31-32.
24. Id. at 33-4 1. He follows this presentation with the remark that, "By
contrast with the Virginia history, the congressional debates on consideration
of the Amendment reveal only sparse discussion, reflecting the fact that the
essential issues had been settled." Id. at 42.
25. 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985).
1990]
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opponents' terrain. For, although he downplays Jefferson's
framer's role and wall of separation between church and state
metaphor, he does admit the preeminent role Madison played
in establishment clause framing.2 6 Likewise, he admits the role
Everson asserts Jefferson and Madison played in the enactment
of the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty. 7 But he denies
the relevance of that struggle to Madison's role in proposing
the amendment in the House of Representatives. 8 Finally, he
parses the House debate and related history to conclude that
the establishment clause bars only preferential aid to religion.29
III. SOME UNEXAMINED AsSUMPTIONS
I belabor the received view of framers' intent in Justice
Black's Everson opinion and the dissenting view in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Jafree dissent for two reasons. First, these two
opinions crystallize and canonize the arguments and sources of
the separationist and nonpreferentialist positions respectively
in the current academic debate. But, more important for my
purposes, they help to show that both sides, despite diametri-
cally opposed historical conclusions, start from basically similar
views of what the relevant historical materials are, how they are
to be approached, and how they are relevant today. It is just
these common, unstated assumptions that I go on now to
challenge.
Now let me summarize some assumptions made by both
the received and dissenting views of framers' intent here, so
that I can proceed to undermine them.
1. Framers' intent is a specific matter of historically discov-
erable fact."0
26. Id. at 92-94.
27. Id. at 92.
28. But when we turn to the record of the proceedings in the First
Congress leading up to the adoption of the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution, including Madison's significant contribution
thereto, we see a far different picture of its purpose than the highly
simplified "wall of separation between church and State."
Id.
29. The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke were
concerned, appears to have been the establishment of a national
church, and perhaps the preference of one religious sect over
another; but it was definitely not concerned about whether
Government might aid all religions evenhandedly.
Id.; see id. at 92-106.
30. They reject what Professors Corwin and Monaghan call the two-
clause theory of the Constitution. See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 361-67 (1981).
EVERSON V BROWN
2. These facts can be determined from the writings, state-
ments, and actions of particular historical actors. 3 '
3. Somehow these specific statements and acts give rise to
general, sweeping constitutional principles which underlie the
more ambiguous constitutional text.3"
4. These sweeping constitutional principles are applicable
to all future times and cases in a direct, unexceptional
manner.
3 3
My general reply to these assumptions is that matters are
significantly more complicated and less clear than these views
assume. Let me introduce one hermeneutic distinction to give
some order to my critique. In attempting to discover author's
intent and textual meaning, hermeneuts often distinguish two
dimensions of the problem. One is sometimes called the hori-
zontal dimension. It involves the problems in assembling an
intent or meaning out of the individual intents and other fac-
tors present in the synchronic time slice of the text's creation.34
This is an important issue especially where, as with the Consti-
tution, a text has many authors or framers. A complementary
problem exists along the vertical dimension. This involves
meaning change through time and the application of a text or
an intent to situations and cases not foreseen at the original
writing. 35 Let me deal with-the horizontal problems first since
they are more conventional and more briefly stated.
IV. THE HORIZONTAL CRITIQUE
The hermeneut must face the possibility that there will just
be no fact of the matter about the common intent of a group of
authors or framers of a document, especially where the histori-
cal net is widely and sensitively cast. The idea is to avoid a false
clarity gained through selective use of sources and partial read-
ings even of the ones selected.
In this context, the main horizontal problem is the empha-
sis on the roles of Jefferson and Madison and the events lead-
ing to the enactment of the Virginia Statute of Religious
Liberty of 1786 in determining the original meaning of the
31. The debate on both sides is long on documentation, but short on
methodology. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text for Everson's
historical argument.
32. See supra note 19 for Everson's paradigmatic list of prohibitions.
33. In Everson and elsewhere this is typically a consequence of their
categorical cast.




668 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
establishment clause. Even an ardent separationist must make
some factual concessions here. For example, Jefferson, at least
technically, was not a framer, since he was ambassador to
France at the time. Second, the statements made by Madison
during the congressional debate were not those of his Memo-
rial and Remonstrance or other efforts several years earlier in
Virginia. Certainly, as the text of the first amendment demon-
strates, the relations between Church and State the framers
permitted differed for the federal government on the one hand
and the states on the other.
The difficulties in treating later documents by Madison
and Jefferson as demonstrative of framers' intent is even more
severe. Yet judges and academics have relied on sources like
Jefferson's "wall of separation" image from his letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association 6 and Madison's late views stated
in his Detached Memoranda3 7 as demonstrative of the original
intent and meaning of the establishment clause. Yet, neither
was composed until the following century.
There are serious problems even with the congressional
debate of the amendment. Lloyd's notes of the debate in the
House are incomplete and inaccurate.38 There are no notes of
the Senate debate, which was held in secret. 39 Beyond the
accuracy of our historical records, there is the problem of the
importance the framers themselves attached to their debate
and the psychological intent it might have expressed. H. Jeffer-
son Powell has argued persuasively that the Constitution's
framers did not see their psychological intent as important in
determining the meaning of constitutional provisions. Instead,
they held an objective rather than a psychological view of
intent. For them intent was to be found on the face of a docu-
ment rather than in the mind of its framers.4 °
Add to this the problem that at least the federalist propo-
nents of the Constitution did not feel that the amendments
suggested were necessary since the federal government was
one of delegated powers. Madison and others held the amend-
ments to be unnecessary because Congress lacked power to
36. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); Everson,
330 U.S. at 16; L. LEVY, supra note 13 at 181-83; but seeJaffree, 472 U.S. at 91-
92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 807-08 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 98.
38. See L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 187-89.
39. See id. at 187.
40. Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 901-13, 935-44 (1985).
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legislate in the areas of the proffered prohibitions in the first
place.4 The amendments for them at best constituted harm-
less reassurances. This situation also complicates the usual
relation between proponents and opponents of measures in
determining legislative intent. For if the intent of proponents
is normally more relevant to meaning than that of opponents,
which roles do the federalists and anti-federalists fill here? The
federalists in convention proposed the Constitution, but did
not see fit to provide a Bill of Rights. Anti-federalist opposi-
tion to the Constitution in large measure generated the push
for amendments.4 2 Although many states proffered amend-
ments, when the time for congressional consideration came,
the draft bill came from the federalist Madison. And even his
text was modified and remodified through both federalist and
anti-federalist suggestions.
The framers are arguably not even the most important
source of the meaning of the provision. This position may well
go to the ratifiers in the state conventions, for whom we pos-
sess yet less clear and less compelling evidence of intent. The
Constitution is unlike normal legislation in this respect. The
framers are not the adopters; they are not even of the same
deliberative body as the adopters. The actual adopters of the
Constitution met in separate session on a state-by-state basis.
The ratifiers had the text of the amendments, but they could
not have been as familiar with the framers' debates as a legisla-
tive body would normally be with the action of one of its com-
mittees sending legislation to the floor for approval.
Nonpreferentialists also point to legislative acts by the first
Congress and others apparently inconsistent with the received
view of framers' intent. These acts include the request that
President Washington issue a Thanksgiving day proclamation,
existence of a legislative chaplain, and support of religious edu-
cation in the Northwest Ordinance and various Indian
treaties. 4
3
Nonpreferentialists use these sorts of horizontal argu-
ments to show weaknesses in the received view of framers'
41. See, e.g., L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 115; Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid
to Religion: A False Claim about Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 907
(1986).
42. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 41, at 908; Kurland, The Origins of the
Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 850 (1986).
43. See, e.g.,Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 100-04 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting); Marsh,
463 U.S. at 788; R. CORD, supra note 13, at 27-29, 38-41, 53-63.
1990]
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intent and the establishment clause.44 With this I can agree.
We part company, however, over their further assertion that
these arguments demonstrate their positive thesis that the
framers supported the constitutionality of nonpreferential aid
to religion. Instead, what I think these problems show is that
we make a mistake in assuming the framers had our problems
and situation in mind just because they used some of the same
words and concepts we do today or because the first amend-
ment has not itself been amended since 1789. On the contrary,
the meaning of these words, concepts, and provisions has
changed in crucial ways in two centuries because the back-
ground context against which these things show up has
changed. This is the vertical problem of hermeneutic interpre-
tation I mentioned earlier. This is the positive, more important
aspect of my critique of the nonpreferentialism debate. Let me
now turn to it.
V. THE VERTICAL CRITIQUE
The horizontal critique of the nonpreferentialism debate
argues that there just may be no fact of the matter about the
original understanding of the establishment clause. The verti-
cal critique is separate and independent, applying even if the
horizontal critique is flawed. It holds that, even if the received
view and the dissenting view are correct in assuming that there
is discoverable truth about what the framers meant and that
this may be found in their statements and actions, this is still
not sufficient to determine current case results. The vertical
critique puts into question, then, the third and fourth assump-
tions the received and dissenting views make-that the original
intent gives rise to general, sweeping constitutional principles
and that these principles are directly and mechanically applica-
ble to all future situations and cases.4 5
The debate participants and I agree with Holmes on the
necessity of historical continuity; we differ on its nature. The
received and dissenting views make continuity trivial because
they overlook historical differences and development. True,
both judges and scholars sometimes make passing remarks on
the complexity of the historical record or the difference
between the framers' and modern situations.46 Yet, like Justice
Black in Everson, they then proceed to employ broad, timeless,
44. Their view is conveyed in the subtitle of Cord's book - historical
fact and current fiction. See R. CORD, supra note 13.
45. See supra notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 8; L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 175-76.
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and exceptionless principles of establishment clause mean-
ing.47 The separationists employ Everson's received view that
all aids to religion are impermissible, while the nonpreferen-
tialists champion the dissenting view that nonpreferential aids
are permitted (or even required).
VI. HERMENEUTICS AND PRAGMATISM
Several hermeneutic notions will aid in the exposition of
my alternative view, so I will introduce them now. Hermeneuts
recognize that we and the framers live in different worlds. One
way of capturing this insight is to say that we live and function
within one historical horizon or form of life and that they lived
within another. 4' Despite important continuities between the
two, there are also significant differences arising out of differ-
ent historical, political, cultural, and social contexts. Doubtless
there is historical continuity between the two, but as Holmes
elsewhere said this continuity is organic and experiential. He
charges us that,
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constit-
uent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we
must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was
enough for them to realize or to hope that they had cre-
ated an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they cre-
ated a nation. The case before us must be considered in
the light of our whole experience and not merely in that
of what was said a hundred years ago.49
Holmes' charge also implicates two other hermeneutic
notions. The first is the notion of an effective history. The idea
here is that the current meaning of word or concept is deter-
47. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-15; L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 1-119. In
fairness, there are some notable exceptions to this move. Mark Tushnet, for
example, suggests that, "The growth of pluralism . . . transformed the
problem of establishment." He finds that, "The framers' generation had not
developed a conceptual scheme to express its understanding of the proper
relation between religion and government." Tushnet, The Origins of the
Establishment Clause (Book Review), 75 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1513 (1987). See also
Laycock, supra note 41, at 913-14, 919-20.
48. The notion of the historical interpreter confronting two different
historical horizons is basic to contemporary philosophical hermeneutics. See
H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 269-73 (G. Barden andJ. Cumming trans.
1975).
49. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
1990)
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mined by the history of its use from its inception through its
controversial and noncontroversial applications to the situation
which confronts us today.50 The second notion is that of cru-
cial importance of application in meaning and interpretation.5 '
Meaning is not, to use another Holmesian phrase, some
"brooding omnipresence in the sky." Both of these hermeneu-
tic notions should be familiar and congenial to lawyers operat-
ing in a common law system. But they are both contrary to the
accounts of framers' intent in the received and dissenting views
we have examined.
Holmes' pragmatic view of the historical and organic
development of constitutional provisions and concepts applies
as well to institutions. Brown v. Board of Education brings this
idea out in a paradigmatic way. Compare, for example, Brown's
historiography with that of Everson.
VII. THE BROWN PARADIGM
Framers' intent is a crucial issue in Brown. In fact,
"[r]eargument was largely devoted to the circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868. "52 Yet, Brown lacks Everson's extensive historical narra-
tive. Speaking of the historical sources, Chief Justice Warren
writes that, "At best, they are inconclusive."5 " This result
stands in marked contrast to the result in Everson. The differ-
ence arises out of Brown's pragmatic approach to historiogra-
phy, rather than a physical inferiority of the historical record.
If anything, the historical record concerning the fourteenth
amendment in Brown is superior to that of the first amendment
in Everson. The record of the congressional framing proceed-
ings is more accurate and more complete. So, too, the state
ratification proceedings. Far less time had passed since the
amendment's adoption than in Everson. Moreover, the history
of only one amendment needs examination. In Everson,
because of the incorporation issue, both the first amendment
and fourteenth amendment are arguably relevant.
A clue to the answer is provided in Chief Justice Warren's
remark that, "An additional reason for the inconclusive nature
of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated
schools, is the status of public education at that time." 54 He
50. See H. GADAMER, supra note 48, at 267-74.
51. See id. at 274-78.




notes the rudimentary, undeveloped nature of free public edu-
cation in both the North and the South in the 1860s. He brings
his historical discussion to a close with an organic, almost
Holmesian, summation. "In approaching this problem, we
cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its full devel-
opment and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation."55 Warren then continues the contrast saying, "Today,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments."5 6 He goes on to base the result in Brown
and the departure from Plessy in large part on the changed sta-
tus of education in modern-day America.
My concern here is neither with the substantive result in
Brown nor with substantive questions of equal protection doc-
trine, but rather with the Court's historiography and use of
framers' intent. Note first that Warren denies all four historio-
graphic assumptions made by both the received and dissenting
views in the establishment clause area.57 There is no simple
discoverable historical matter of fact about the framers' intent
concerning the fourteenth amendment for him. The state-
ments, writings, and actions of the framers are simply inconclu-
sive. So he derives from them no general sweeping principles
applicable to equal protection cases in all times and contexts.
He recites no litany of constitutional prohibitions as Justice
Black does in Everson.
In fact, Warren's opinion in Brown allows for constitutional
change in a way that both contemporary establishment clause
views implicitly deny. Both the received and dissenting views
assume that the 1789 meaning of the establishment clause is
the same as the 1989 meaning. But Brown stands for the view
that that meaning can change. Public school segregation might
have been constitutional in 1868, but unconstitutional in 1954.
Do I overread the historical record in this? Brown only says that
the historical materials are inconclusive; it does not in so many
words say that the framers thought that public school segrega-
tion was unconstitutional.
Fortunately, Alexander Bickel has already answered this
objection in his work on the original understanding and the
55. Id. at 492-93.
56. Id. at 493.
57. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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desegregation decision.58  He contrasts a static view of the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment much like the view of
the establishment clause I have criticized with "an awareness
on the part of these framers that it was a constitution they were
writing, which led to a choice of language capable of growth." 59
If the Court had taken the first, crabbed view, "[i]t could have
deemed itself bound by the legislative history showing the
immediate objectives to which section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment was addressed, and rather clearly demonstrating
that it was not expected in 1866 to apply to segregation." 60
This evaluation of the specific and immediate intent of the
framers of the fourteenth amendment is also found in critics of
the Brown decision, such as Raoul Berger. 61 But because they
typically have the static view of history which limits framers'
intent to specific and immediate intent, they are torn between
accepting a Plessy-like decision they find imprudent and
unpalatable and repudiation of their view of framers' intent.
62
But their dilemma is avoidable. Brown and Bickel point the way
toward a more flexible third alternative. Like Holmes'
approach, it allows for the possibility of historical growth and
evolution without amendment. It allows us to remove our his-
torical blinders.
VIII. CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTIONS
One caution here. The pragmatic and evolutionary
approach to framers' intent and constitutional interpretation I
am here defending against its less flexible opponents is not the
same as the account of constitutional interpretation based on a
distinction between concepts and conceptions expounded by
Ronald Dworkin and applied to the establishment clause area
by David Richards. That distinction, as originally set out by
Dworkin, is between a general umbrella category, the concept,
and its numerous individual varieties, the conceptions.63
Under this approach, a "vague" constitutional provision, say
the eighth amendment, employs certain general concepts (in
58. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
59. Id. at 63 (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 64.
61. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-33 (1977).
62. Berger concludes that it would be "utterly unrealistic and probably
impossible to undo the past in the face of the expectations that the
segregation decisions... have aroused in our black citizenry." Id. at 412-13.
63. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977). The
death penalty example is one given by Dworkin.
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this case the concept of the cruel and unusual). The Court as
interpreter of this constitutional provision in a capital punish-
ment case, rather than being bound by what the framers of the
eighth amendment thought about the constitutionality of the
death penalty, is free to reach a different determination if it
finds that another conception of the cruel and the unusual
which bars the death penalty is superior to the framers' concep-
tion. How superior? The standard Dworkin and Richards
employ is philosophical rather than historical. 6' So the Court
would not be bound by the specific intent of the framers in this
approach if there is a philosophically preferable alternative
available.
Mark Tushnet criticizes Richards' application of this
approach to the religion clauses context, saying in part that it
just is not a theory of framers' intent, but of something else.6 5
He could have added that it is not a theory of constitutional inter-
pretation either, but of something else, say philosophical inter-
pretation or perhaps the interpretation of the "unwritten
constitution." The shortcomings of the Dworkin/Richards
approach here are in fact not all that different from the short-
comings of the received and dissenting establishment clause
views I critique. Both assume the existence of right answers
based on discoverable matters of fact (be they philosophical or
historical). 66 They also develop from these facts broad, gen-
eral, sweeping principles which are independent of time, con-
text, and development and which are applicable in a
straightforward way to a wide range of cases.6 7
One can summarize these similarities by saying that both
stand for neutral principles as that notion has evolved out of
Herbert Wechsler's criticism of Brown.68 An acceptance of my
account of Brown or of the pragmatic/hermeneutic approach it
exemplifies is a rejection of the neutral principles critique of
Brown as being part of the historiographic problem Brown itself
attempts to overcome.
64. Dworkin goes on to call for "a fusion of constitutional law and
moral theory." Id. at 149.
65. Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33 Loy.
L. REV. 221, 232-35 (1987) (discussing D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION, 58-59, 208 (1986)).
66. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119-45 (1985).
67. At base they all derive from a right to equal concern and respect.
See R. DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 180-83, 272-78.
68. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959).
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Let me finish with a Brownian critique and rewriting of
Everson. Since my approach does not, in fact, compel me to opt
for either separationism or nonpreferentialism, let me empha-
size that it need not bring about reversal in Everson's decision,
only a change in its methodology.
IX. REWRITING EVERSON
A rewrite of Everson in light of Brown would render Justice
Black's Everson dilemma more intelligible, if not more readily
resolvable. It would do this by pointing to the changing histor-
ical context and parameters from 1789 to 1947. There is only
space here to sketch the sorts of factors it might consider.
Many of these have already individually been recognized by
commentators, but not presented in a systematic and pur-
poseful way. This is not to say that there is a clear result or
right answer here, as I believe there is in Brown. One thing the
hermeneutic/pragmatic approach does not guarantee is easy
answers to hard cases.
Turning to the new Everson itself, the historical account
given would clearly be more tentative. The "definitive" history
presented by Justice Black, or for that matter by Justice Rut-
ledge in his Everson dissent, might be replaced by a shorter
admission of the inconclusive nature of the historical record.
But it would be inconclusive in the way that Bickel explains that
term. Cribbing again, the opinion might say that just as one
cannot turn the clock back to 1868, neither can one turn it back
to 1789. This is because the concepts and institutions involved
have shifted, even if the terms and text involved deceptively
remained the same.
No one today, except for the rare nonincorporationist,
argues that the Virginia General Assessment Bill of 1784 would
be constitutional if enacted by a contemporary state legislature.
It would violate all three prongs of the Lemon test, 69 having a
religious purpose and effect and entangling church and state
both politically and administratively. But even contemporary
opponents of Lemon who champion such recent decisions as
Marsh v. Chambers, would void the Bill on historical grounds.
But, in an important way, this is beside the point.7" For the
sort of nonpreferential aid found in the Virginia General
Assessment Bill is quite different from that championed by
nonpreferentialists today. The aid to religion in that Bill was
69. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (examining the
purpose of, effect of, and entanglement caused by governmental action).
70. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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both direct and exclusive in ways current aid programs typically
are not. For example, the New Jersey statute in Everson, at least
as interpreted by the Court, made school busing generally
available to both public and private nonprofit school chil-
dren.7 Likewise, the federal statute in question in Aguilar v.
Felton made secular remedial educational aid generally available
to students in private and public, religious and secular
schools .72
The more relevant question, then, is whether the Everson
orAguilar problems are of a type foreseen by the framers. Con-
temporary separationists and nonpreferentialists can only
answer yes in a general sense because they infer sweeping bans
or permissions from the specific acts and statements of the
framers. But there is no specific evidence that they can point to
in the historical record that would show the framers' opposi-
tion or attachment to these legislative schemes because these
sorts of programs simply did not exist at that time. Nor are
they significantly similar to programs and institutions which did
then exist. Let me canvass just a few areas of significant change
in the intervening two centuries to illustrate this proposition.
Certainly, institutions and theories of federalism have
changed markedly since the framing of the first amendment.
Then important doctrines of states' rights, limited and dele-
gated federal powers, and concurrent sovereignty have long
since faded away. The fairly uniform opposition to federal reli-
gious power in the Convention and the Congress clearly did
not reflect a parallel uniform opposition to state power to legis-
late in the area of religion. Then existing state establishments
are just the clearest evidence of this fact. Moreover, doctrines
of federal power melded with attitudes towards religion to
form combinations no longer found on the contemporary
scene. So, for example, a nonpreferentialist anti-federalist like
Patrick Henry opposed on state's rights grounds federal power
to legislate with respect to religion while he supported the
same sort of power on behalf of the states.73
Just as the adoption of the fourteenth amendment changed
the federalism landscape markedly, Everson's incorporation of
the establishment clause through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment changed the constitutional standards
71. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3 & n.1, 18. But see id. at 19-21 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that in this case the only nonpublic schools involved are
Catholic schools).
72. 473 U.S. 402, 404-06 (1985).
73. See L. LEVY, supra note 13, at 109-10.
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applicable to the states and the relation between federal and
state standards. In the pre-Civil War era it was an uncontrover-
sial given that the constitutional requirements to respect indi-
vidual rights to which the states and federal government were
held were quite different."4 In the main, the states were lim-
ited, if at all, by their own constitutions. Nowadays, as cases
like Boling v. Sharpe75 indicate, the assumption that the stan-
dards should be identical is so strong that a matching standard
will be found even if the textual basis for it is weak. In addi-
tion, in the context of the framers' intent debate, the incorpo-
ration of the establishment clause creates the irony that a
standard is now applicable to the states which neither the fram-
ers' of the first nor the fourteenth amendments apparently spe-
cifically intended to apply to the states.
The rise of the welfare state and the creation and imple-
mentation of governmental welfare powers has caused changes
parallel to the shift in conceptions of federalism. The view of
most framers on the welfare duties and competencies of gov-
ernment, especially federal government, would today have
placed them on the libertarian end of the political spectrum.76
A dominant federal and state role in education, health care,
and all other forms of public welfare is not so much something
the framers opposed as it is something they did not even con-
ceive of. We have entered an era in which it is reasonable,
although not yet accepted, to argue that these governmental
welfare functions are not merely permissible, but constitution-
ally mandatory.77
Finally, concepts and institutions of religion and education
have shifted markedly. Brown's contrast of the states of public
education in 1868 and 1954 could readily be expanded and
strengthened to compare public education in 1947 with the
rudimentary, if not nonexistent, public education in 1789. The
Virginia General Assessment Bill of 1784 stands as an example
ofjust how intimately education and religion were intertwined
74. Primarily because the federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833).
75. 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (ending racial segregation in the District of
Columbia public schools through the equal protection component of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment).
76. Hamilton may have been an exception. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note
41, at 907.
77. See, e.g., Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 659; Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls' Theory ofJustice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973).
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in the framers' era.78 This connection is all but reversed for
the members of the Everson Court and many others today.79
Moreover, religious nonpreferentialism in the 1780s
applied at best to all Christians, and perhaps only to all Protes-
tants. Tolerance for and civic acceptance of Catholics, non-
Christians, and atheists was not part of the 1780s view of non-
preferentialism.8a  In the 1780s nonpreferentialism meant
something closer to multiple establishment. But this is not its
modern meaning.
This example points up the dangers of misunderstanding
which occur when seemingly similar terms are taken out of
their distinctive historical contexts. There is a very strong ten-
dency to (mis)interpret deceptively familiar concepts taken
from another context in terms of one's own context and prac-
tices. Confusion or misunderstanding is usually the result. A
classic example occurs in the philosophy of science where
Thomas Kuhn ponders apparently bizarre statements in Aris-
totle's Physics.8 1 Aristotle's term kinesis is generally translated in
English as motion. But when this is done, Aristotle is made to
say things which are patently not true about motion. It was
Kuhn's insight that Aristotle's term imported something more
general, applying to qualitative as well as quantitative changes
of physical objects. This larger understanding made Aristotle's
seemingly strange statements more intelligible.
A similar sort of problem presents itself in the nonprefer-
entialism debate, too. Thomas Curry, for example, argues that
despite the fact they use something like our terms, the framers
78. The Bill's preamble states that
Whereas the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natural
tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and
preserve the peace of society; which cannot be effected without a
competent provision for learned teachers, who may be thereby
enabled to devote their time and attention to the duty of instructing
such citizens, as from their circumstances and want of education,
cannot otherwise attain such knowledge; and it is judged that such
provision may be made by the Legislature, without counteracting
the liberal principle heretofore adopted and intended to be
preserved by abolishing all distinctions of pre-eminence amongst
the different societies or communities of Christians.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 72 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
79. JusticeJackson contends, for example, that, "Our public school...
is organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all
religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal
knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion." Id. at
23-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 41, at 918-19.
81. T. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION xi-xii (1977).
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did not really understand the distinction between preferential
and nonpreferential aid to religion.82 Douglas Laycock, on the
other hand, argues that they understood the distinction, but
rejected nonpreferentialism. 83
I would argue that the framers understood this distinction,
but that they understood it differently than we do. Curry would
be right to say that the framers did not understand or foresee
the distinction, for example, as it presented itself in Justice
Black's dilemma in Everson. Laycock is probably also right that
the framers rejected nonpreferential aid, at least by the federal
government. We reject some nonpreferential aid today, but
not necessarily the same aid. We are not today so concerned
with preserving state prerogatives or state establishments from
federal encroachment. A federal government of limited, dele-
gated powers may still be a constitutional platitude, but it is not
a constitutional priority or reality. On the other hand, the
establishment clause chafes far more today than it did in the
1780s because it bumps up against broad governmental powers
the framers clearly did not specifically contemplate.
CONCLUSION
The most tentative and difficult part of this revised opinion
is the ending because, having criticized several clear, definitive
endings, I have none of my own. Once again let me try to make
a virtue of necessity by saying this. Unlike Brown, the constitu-
tional conflict in the Everson nonpreferentialism situation is far
more balanced. There is no clearly correct historical outcome.
But then the hermeneutic/pragmatic approach does not guar-
antee clear right answers in all cases. Some questions will
remain unavoidably unresolved .on the merits. When historical
argument substitutes for historical assertion, there will be cases
where there is no clear winner or knock-down argument.
In these situations, substantive considerations must be
supplemented with procedural decision methods. These
include stare decisis, burden of proof schemes, and commitment
of the problem to resolution through the political process. The
use of precedent to supplement framers' intent has been sug-
gested by Henry Monaghan.84 A burden of proof approach,
using the model provided by Justice Roberts, has been sug-
gested by William van Alstyne. a5 The political commitment
82. T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 207-15 (1986).
83. Laycock, supra note 41, at 902-03.
84. See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 383-91.
85. See van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful
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approach would simply open up some constitutional elbow
room, creating a range of constitutionally permissible alterna-
tives between the bounds of the constitutionally mandatory and
the constitutionally prohibited. In equal protection terms, one
might call this a reduced scrutiny proposal. Once again, the
law is chagrined to find that philosophy has promised more
answers, but instead provided only more questions.
Contributions of Special Theories ofJudicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209, 225-32
(1983).
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